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The Scope of Allocation in the Public Sector 
Some ambiguity surrounds the concept of "public good" and "pul)lic 
want" in discussions relating to the allocation of resources in the public 
sector of the econpmy. While there is broad agreement that goods to which 
the "exclusion principle" does not ap_ply clearly pertain to the Allocation 
Branch of the public economy (to use Musgrave Is three•-·branch approach to 
budget policy)> the case of goods to which the exclusion principle applies 
at least in part but which either are subject to decreasing costs or give 
1rise to significant external effects is less clear-cut. The aim of this 
paper is to analyze the relationship between these three types of goods and 
their relevance to the allocation of resources in a normative fiscal frame-
work. 
My definition of public good, which I i;,hall seek to justify below, is 
a good which the market mechani.sm either cannot provide at all or which it 
can provide only with a considerable degree of inefficiency. 2 Goods in 
the first category, referred to here as social goods, satisfy what Musgrave calls 
"social wants, 11 those wants to which the exclusion principle does not apply 
since they must be consumed in equal amounts by all 3 In this case one can 
also speak of "indivisibility in consumption II since consumption of these 
goods cannot be tailored to the individual tastes of consumers as is true 
instead of goods supplied through the market. In the second category are 
1 
see R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A .§_!~idv in Public 
Ec0.E£,l]Y. (New York: McGrmv-Hill Book Co., Inc.), 1959, Chapter 1. 
2 
This definition differs from Musgrave I s (ibid., p.. 44) > for whom 
public goods are "goods the inherent quality of which requires public pro­
duction." 
3
rbid., pp. 8-12. 
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found goods of two different kinds, firstly those goods whose provision is 
marked by diffuse and significant external effects on consumption either 
at the national or the local level, and secondly those goods produced by 
indivisible factors of production under the condition of decreasing costs 
in the relevant range of the market demand curve. For the sake of convenience 
these two types of goods, which are not mutually exclusive, will be referred 
to as near-social goods and decreasing··cos·t goods respectively. 
Near-social goods correspond roughly to the satisfaction of what Mus-
grave calls "merit wants," which are considered so important to society 
that they are provided publicly, even though the· exclusion principle may apply. 
Musgrave states that "the satisfaction of merit wants, by its very nature, 
involves interference with consumer preferences 11 by an "informed group. " 
1which exercises leadership in a democratic society, This definition seems 
to me to miss the point. As 11usgrave himself remarks, this interference into 
the want pattern of others may become a dangerous tool in the hands of an 
authoritarian government seeking to extend its power and impose its particular 
views on the rest of the people. Such a government may.freely interpret the 
consensus of society so as to suit its own ends instead of depending,on the 
consent of the governed, 
It seems unnecessary to rationalize the satisfaction of near-social 
wants in that way. Surely the advantages of subsidized low-cost housing 
' 
and of universal education are seen not only by an enlightened few, but by 
a majority of the people, and the satisfaction of these ,-1ants need not 
involve any more serious a departure from consumer sovereignty than is 
true of social wants proper, A more useful way of describin6 near-social 
wants is to say that their satisfaction consists both of direct individual 
consumption to which the exclusion principle could apply and of collective 
consumption to which it could not. They are thus located somewhere along 
the continuum that goes from private wants .to social wants, their satis­
faction creating significant externaliti.es on the consumption side. This 
points to the fact that pure social wants are the polar instance of e)cternal 
effects, since their satisfaction is mainly external and collective and 
little or none is private and individual. This is recognized by Musgrave, 
as is the fact that his "merit wants may involve substantial elements of 
social wants. ,l I think it therefore more appropriate to make the degree 
of externality the criterion for deciding on the social quality of a 
given good or service as regards consumption, while conceding the diffi­
culties involved in making such a concept operational. Education and 
vaccination are two examples of near-social goods. In both cases there 
is a direct benefit accruing to the immediate recipient, as well as an 
indirect benefit to the society as a whole. 
The case of decreasing-cost industries has received considerable 
attention in the literature, 3 Efficient allocation requires the industri 
1
Nusgrave, QE. ~it.. , pp. 8, 13. 
2
For a succinct statement of the problems involved, as well as an 
extensive bibliography, see Musgrave, _ibid., Chapter 7, pp. 136-140. 
to produce at a level where price falls short of average cost. A subsidy-
is therefore needed to secure an optimal output. An oft-cited example is 
that of a bridge. If maintenance costs are independent of the rate of its 
utilization, the cost of an additional crossing is zero and so therefore 
is the efficiency price once the bridge has been built, The exclusion 
principle can normally be applied to decreasing-cost goods, if at great 
administrative cost (as in the case of roads in an urban area). Its 
application. where marginal cost is zero leads however. to inefficiency, 
Even if MC is not zero, efficient pricing can only cover variable costs but 
not fixed costs. To know whether investment in such industries is justified, 
it is necessary to have recourse to a political decision-making process 
. 1 
just as in the case of social wants (and, I would add, near~social wants), 
The feature which is common to social goods, near-social goods and 
decreasing~cost goods is neither the non-applicability of the exclusion 
principle nor the presence of externalities or of decreasing costs, but 
the fact that their efficient provision can only come about through a 
political process instead of through the market mechanism. It is this 
feature ,,hich I invoke as my justification for including all three 'as public 
2goods in the Allocation Branch of an efficient Fiscal Department. 
The above classification shows that the difference between social and 
near-social wants is one of degree rather than of kind (hence the designation 
1
Ibid.. , p. 139. 
2
These of course do not exhaust the functions of the Allocation Branch, 
which comprise others such as antitrust action and the control of monopoly 
due to lack of free entry. See :Musgrave, ibid,, pp. 6-8. 
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I use for the latter), since both involve to a greater or lesser extent 
externalities or indivisibilities on the consumption side. In the limit 
(that is, in the case of pure social goods) the consumption of X does not 
subtract anything from the consumption of Y or Z, The cost of marginal. 
use is therefore zero. Decreasing-cost goods, on the other hand, usually 
differ in kind from the other two types of public goods since the indivisi­
bility is on the production rather than the consumption side. 1 This point 
appears to be overlooked by.Bator in his otherwise admirable discussion of 
scope I bl· sec .or. \vitht he of t1e pu· ic t 
2 Bator identifies "public goods 11 
the satisfaction both of Husgrave's "social wants" (he then refers to them 
as "pure public goods") and of -what I have referred to as nea1·-social wants. 
He cites a bridge as an example of a pure public good on the strength of 
3the fact that the cost of an additional crossing is zero. 
It seems to me that the case of a bridge belongs instead to the 
immediately preceding section in the same chapter [Where the "Invisible 
Hand" Fails (1) J, where Bator discusses the failure of the market to 
efficiently allocate resources in the decreasing-cost sit1,1ation. 4 Indeed, 
in that very section he cites the bridge as an example of a good w:i:th a 
large initial fixed cost and low (zero) variable cost. The reason for 
1This is not to deny that a decreasing-cost good may also give rise 
to externalities of consumption. For example; a new road or bridge may 
raise nearby real estate values or lead to increased economic activity in 
the neighborhood. 
2 
see F.M. Bator, The Question of Government Spending: Public Needs 
and Private Hants, (New York; Harper & Brothers), 1960, 
31bi~., pp. 93-98. 
lf
Ibid., pp. 88-83. 
',' 
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using the bridge as a~ example in both sections is apparently the confusi6n 
of a good or service the cost of a marginal unit of which is zero (such as 
an additional crossirig of a bridge) with a good satisfying a social want, 
where the cost of marginal use by an additional person is zero, since 
consumption is a function of total supply. The first involves the marginal 
cost of production, the second the marginal cost of consumption, and these 
are conceptually distinct. In the first case demand schedules are added 
horizontally, in the second case vertically. It is therefore incorrect 
to say that 11 in a sense, as use of the bridge as an example has already 
implied, a 'public good 1 situation is simply a polar instance of decreasing 
costs. 111 Instead I have argued above that it is more appropriate to regard 
such a social want situation as a polar instance of external effects on 
collective consumption. 
The above considerations apply both to developed and to underdeveloped 
countries. In the latter, however, a fourth responsibility of· the Alloca­
tion Branch adds itself to the three already discussed, namely the integrated 
planning of the industrialization of the country. The need for this 
.... 
springs from the presence of what Scitovsky has called 11 pecuniary external 
economies 11 derived from (indirect) interdependence among producers through 
-· 
2the market mechanism. The social benefit arising from the expansion of 
a given industry diverges fro~ its private profitability because (inter 
ali-_i0 of the cheaper products it makes available to other industries. 
l.Th.isi,' p. 96. 
2
T. Scitovsky, "Two Concepts of External Economies," The Journal of 
Political Economy, April 1954. 
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Investment therefore tends to be less than optimal because of the impossi~ 
bility for a certain industry to forecast what future demand and supply 
conditions will be. These externalities on the production side call for 
action by the Allocation Branch just as much as the previously mentioned 
externalities on the consumption side and indivisibilities both of con­
sumption and production. 
